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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, the Court should consider 
the following three issues. Issues One and Two are fairly included in the questions 
presented for review in the petition for certiorari:1 
Issue One. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly stated Utah law when it held 
that a defendant is liable for the full amount of damages that result from aggravation of 
preexisting conditions that are dormant at the time of the accident, and that to determine 
whether a jury can be instructed on apportionment, the "crucial question" is whether 
those preexisting conditions were dormant on the date of the accident. (Pet. Cert. 5, 14-
16; Order Grant'g Cert. If 4.) 
This Court reviews the legal conclusions of the court of appeals for correctness. 
See State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, If 10, 100 P.3d 1222. 
Issue Two. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that it was prejudicial 
error for the district court to instruct the jury to apportion damages between the injuries 
caused by the accident and preexisting conditions where there was (a) no evidence that 
Wendy's preexisting conditions were symptomatic at the time of the accident, (b) no 
evidence that Wendy's injuries were activated independently of the accident at ShopKo, 
(c) no evidence that would have provided the jury with a reasonable basis for 
apportioning Wendy's injuries between the accident and preexisting conditions, and (d) 
1. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). Respondent has rephrased the issues from the 
original questions presented for review to make the scope and of the issues clearer and 
more comprehensive. The citation showing the portions of the petition and order granting 
certiorari where these issues were included is located in parentheses after each issue. 
1 
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there was insufficient evidence to justify the jury's award on of one-third of the requested 
past and future medical expenses on grounds that the expenses were not reasonable and 
necessary. (Pet. Cert. 5, 12-14, 16-18.) 
This Court reviews a decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, adopting 
the same standard of review of the trial court's decision used by the Court of Appeals. 
State v. Findlayson, 2000 UT 10, \ 6, 994 P.2d 1243. Whether a jury instruction is 
properly given is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Kirkpatrick v. Wiley 
Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, If 64, 37 P.3d 1130. 
Additionally, Respondent submits that the Court of Appeals' decision can be 
affirmed on the alternative ground presented in Issue Three:2 
Issue Three. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on reducing 
future damages to present value where ShopKo had produced no evidence that would 
give the jury a basis to calculate the reduction of future damages to present value. 
Whether a jury instruction is properly given is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. See Kirkpatrick, 2001 UT 107 at \ 64. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. BACKGROUND or THE LITIGATION 
Wendy Harris's Accident at ShopKo. On March 29, 2006, Appellant Wendy 
Harris went into ShopKo's Provo store to buy an office chair. (Tr. 692:6-11.)3 There were 
2. The Court may affirm a judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record. Findlayson, 2000 UT 10 at [^ 31. 
2 
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various chairs on display at the store in an area where customers could test the chairs, and 
where the floor was hard and flat. (Tr. 427:8-16; 451:23-25.) Wendy sat in some of the 
chairs to try them out. (Tr. 692:13-16.) As she sat in one of the chairs, the chair suddenly 
split apart; the seat of the chair went flying in one direction and the wheels and base went 
flying in the opposite direction. (Tr. 692:17-693:2.) Wendy fell straight down and landed 
on her wrist and the left side of her tailbone. (Tr. 693:11 -25.) 
She started to get up on her own, and was helped by a ShopKo employee. (Tr. 
694:19-23.) She tried to fill out ShopKo's accident report, but she could not do it. In 
Wendy's own words, "I was shaking. I mean, really shaking. And a young girl behind the 
counter actually filled it out for me." (Tr. 695:7-13.) While she was able to leave the store 
on her own, she was still shaking and she felt "a ringing sensation" in her whole body. 
(Tr. 695:15-23.) 
Medical Care. The next day, Wendy started to feel deep abdominal pain that she 
described as similar to the pain she had after she underwent a hysterectomy. She was 
worried that "something had come loose" from that surgery, and so she went to the 
hospital. (Tr. 696:13-697:8.) 
Over the next few days, Wendy's wrist pain resolved, but the pain localized into 
her lower back and tailbone area. (Tr. 697:15-23.) She went to see her brother, Kay 
Whittaker, a family nurse practitioner, and ultimately saw several other doctors and 
therapists. (698:3-699:19.) The physicians treating her observed that she was suffering 
3. To simplify the record citations and make the brief easier to read, references to the 
trial transcript (R. at 1200-1203) will be abbreviated as Tr., followed by the relevant page 
and line of the transcript. 
3 
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from severe and intense pain in her lower back and tailbone. (Tr. 217:2-8; 344:6-10; 
371:13-373:6; 397:25-398:11; 519:15-520:1; 522:6-15; 573:23-574:17.) The pain 
radiated down the back of her leg to her knee. (Tr. 217:2-8; 397:25-398:11; 540:11-
541:11.) Even after almost three years, the pain did not resolve. (Tr. 217:19-21.) Despite 
incurring over $25,000.00 in medical expenses as of the end of 2008, her treating 
physicians and therapists could not offer her more than temporary relief through pain 
medicine, massage therapy and chiropractic care. (Tr. 378:7-16; 383:10-20; 400:2-8; 
543:3-544:15; 590:13-20; 624:9-20; 675:4-14; 699:2-19; 722:16-723:15; R. at 1197, 229-
237.) 
Wendy's Quality of Life after the Accident. Wendy's pain began to significantly 
interfere with her daily life. Before the accident, Wendy was active and energetic, very 
outgoing and socially involved. (Tr. 647:13-24; 648:13-22; 650:15-20; 667:15-21.) She 
was not suffering from any chronic low-back pain before the accident. (Tr. 240:23-241:1; 
515:17-516:2; 572:7-14; 650:21-24; 670:17-671:5.) She would play tennis with her 
husband and participate in other activities with her family. (Tr. 708:3-709:3.) She would 
often get together with her friends to go shopping and to watch movies together. (Tr. 
648:14-22.) She enjoyed being involved in the PTA, the school activities of her five 
children, and other community projects. (Tr. 648:2-649:10; 669:11-22; 702:21-703:7.) 
She helped her husband with the paperwork for his business. (Tr. 666:12-23.) She also 
felt a deep satisfaction from taking care of her family, and had a vigorous everyday 
schedule of cooking and cleaning her house. (Tr. 670:4-15; 699:20-700:7.) 
After the accident, she attempted to continue with her schedule as normal. In her 
words, "I just thought it was just like anything else; I just had to kind of get through it. 
4 
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And I just knew it would go away. It would go away. I just kept telling myself, 
Tomorrow it will be fine.' You just push yourself and your kids. There's so much to do." 
(Tr. 699:20-700:7.) However, the pain did not go away, and she had to stop doing the 
things she enjoyed doing. (Tr. 683:5-16; 700:8-23.) The pain affected her sleep. (Tr. 
217:22-24.) Her intimate relationship with her husband suffered. (Tr. 709:4-10; 712:19-
21.) She could not sit for long periods of time. (Tr. 651:19-652:11; 725:14-17.) If she 
forced herself to sit, it would aggravate her pain for the next few days. (Tr. 685:13-22.) 
Most days, she was unable to perform everyday tasks like cooking for her family and 
cleaning her house. (Tr. 674:2-675:3.) Her husband devoted less time to work so that he 
could help with the household and help care for her and drive her to doctor's 
appointments. (Tr. 674:13-675:14; 700:13-23.) Their adult daughter moved back into the 
house to help care for Wendy's youngest son, Bridger. (Tr. 708:17-709:3.) Her family's 
activities became limited based on how she could function. (Tr. 677:22-678:4.) She could 
no longer do the things with friends that she once did. (Tr. 654:2-13.) She withdrew from 
her previous active place in the community. (Tr. 656:13-657:1.) 
Wendy's pain and resulting loss of function affected her emotionally. She was 
frustrated and angry that she could not function normally and that she could not get the 
help she needed to ease her pain. (Tr. 676:8-677:8; 700:25-701:19.) The pain began to 
consume her and her family's daily life. (Tr. 677:22-679:8.) 
Of the things she could no longer do, the thing that was hardest on Wendy was 
that she was limited in caring for Bridger. Bridger was three years old at the time of the 
accident. (Tr. 701:20-23.) After the accident, she could no longer pick him up and hold 
him, and could not run and play with him like she used to. (Tr. 701:24-702:16.) She has 
5 
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not been involved with his schooling and activities to the degree that she was with her 
older children. (Tr. 702:21-703:7.) In her testimony, Wendy described a day when she 
had to walk Bridger to preschool because there was no car in which to take him: 
[B]y the time I had gotten—it was about three blocks, long blocks, and then 
you enter this pathway that's really long and it opens up to the back field of the 
school, and you've got a ways to go to get to the school. And by the time I got 
into that gateway area, . . . if you walk, it starts—your back starts having 
spasms all the way up, just severe spasms, and the quicker you go, the worse 
they become I said, "Bridger, you know, Mommy can't go all that way." 
He knew it. He goes, "Okay. Mommy, that's okay. I can do it." . . . I remember 
just being sick watching him. And I thought—I just felt like I was a bad 
mom . . . . I cried all the way home, and I remember keeping my head down. I 
was scared a neighbor would see me or someone would stop to give me a ride. 
I just thought, "I just need to get home. No one needs to see me," and I just got 
home and I didn't go upstairs. I laid down on the living room floor, and I just 
realized I'm never going to be enough for him unless this goes away. 
(Tr. 703:8-705:10.) 
Recent and Future Treatment. Despite her depression, Wendy kept stretching and 
exercising so that she could improve her function and did her best to take care of her 
family. (Tr. 698:16-699:19; 705:15-707:8.) In 2009, a little less than three years after the 
accident, Wendy was referred to Dr. Rosenthal, a board-certified pain management 
specialist. (Tr. 217:13-21.) He diagnosed her with facet joint syndrome, an inflammation 
of one of the spinal joints, (Tr. 224:5-225:25) and coccydinia, inflammation of the 
tailbone. (Tr. 231:20-232:3.) He treated her facet joint syndrome with a radio frequency 
lesioning treatment, which severs the nerve to the facet joint and stops the pain. (Tr. 
229:3-25; 231:7-17.) Wendy testified that the treatment decreased her pain and increased 
her function and quality of life. (Tr. 709:16-710:16.) Because the nerve will eventually 
repair itself, this process will need to be repeated every 9-14 months for about seven 
years until the nerve stops growing back. (Tr. 249:1 -16.) 
6 
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Coccydinia is difficult to treat, since putting any pressure on the tailbone prevents 
healing. (Tr. 232:4-12.) However, sitting on a donut cushion, along with occasional 
injection of steroids and anesthetics to reduce the inflammation of the ligaments of the 
tailbone, will likely eventually allow the tailbone to heal. (Tr. 233:6-19.) In the 
meantime, Dr. Rosenthal recommended continuing pain medicine to manage any 
remaining pain. (Tr. 250:7-251:2.) 
While Dr. Rosenthal believes that Wendy's pain will ultimately resolve, (Tr. 
256:13-25) he noted that she will have permanent loss of mobility in her lower spine, (Tr. 
257:8-258:1) and that it is possible that she will develop sciatica from her injuries related 
to the accident at ShopKo. (Tr. 258:2-17.) Despite that, the reduction in pain has allowed 
Wendy to do more of the things that she did before the accident. (Tr. 657:2-658:2; 
680:14-23; 709:16-710:16.) 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Apportionment Jury Instruction. During the jury instruction conference of July 
16, 2009, Plaintiff objected to instructing the jury regarding apportionment of prior 
injuries, based on the fact that Defendant had not introduced evidence that any of 
Plaintiffs injuries to her lower back were caused by a prior condition, and that Defendant 
had not introduced any evidence that would provide any basis for apportionment. (Tr. 
845:11-848:25; 885:7-887:8.) Notwithstanding Plaintiffs objection, the trial court 
instructed the jury on apportionment of damages for prior conditions. (Tr. 945:7-946:4.) 
Testimony as to Economic Damages. Dr. Rosenthal appeared as an expert witness 
at the trial. He testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it was more likely 
than not that Wendy's pain and injuries were caused by the accident at ShopKo, (Tr. 
7 
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235:25-236:23; 244:24-245:9) that the $33,203.34 in medical expenses she had incurred 
since the accident were medically necessary, (Tr. 245:18-246:14) and that she had 
sustained permanent injuries that would require future medical care in the amount of 
$39,574.00. (Tr. 246:17-247:3.) The parties had earlier stipulated that the amounts of the 
prior treatments were reasonable, (R. at 863; 865-64) and Dr. Rosenthal testified that the 
amounts of the future treatments were reasonable. (Tr. 247:6-9.) 
Present Value Jury Instruction. On January 21, 2009, the trial court issued a 
minute entry placing the burden on Defendant to prove the reduction of future damages to 
present value. (R. at 381-380.) Defendant offered no proof and presented no evidence at 
trial that would provide the jury with a basis for calculating the present value of future 
damages. (Tr. 851:7-16.) Plaintiff objected to instructing the jury about the issue during 
the jury instruction conference of July 16, 2009, as Defendant had not met its court-
ordered burden of proof on the issue. (Tr. 851:1-852:2.) Nevertheless, the trial court 
instructed the jury to reduce future economic damages to present value. (Tr. 947:2-16.) 
Verdict. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Defendant 100% at fault for 
Plaintiffs injuries. (Tr. 1016:13-1017:1.) The jury awarded Plaintiff economic damages 
in the amount of $25,000.00, comprising past medical expenses of $15,000.00 and future 
medical expenses of $10,000.00, and non-economic damages in the amount of $1,000.00. 
(Tr. 1017:1-4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to prevail on this appeal, ShopKo must convince this Court that (l)(a) The 
Court of Appeals misstated or misapplied the law, and ShopKo would prevail if the law 
8 
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were stated or applied correctly; (b) The Court of Appeals ignored evidence that would 
have justified the district court's giving the jury instruction in question; or (c) The Court 
of Appeals erred in conducting its harmful error analysis; and (2) that there are there are 
no alternate grounds for affirming the Court of Appeals' decision. As explained below, 
the Court of Appeals correctly stated and applied Utah law in determining that a 
defendant is liable for the full amount of damages that result from aggravation of 
preexisting conditions that are dormant at the time of the accident, and so the crucial 
question in determining whether a jury can reduce damages based on preexisting 
conditions is whether those preexisting conditions were dormant on the date of the 
accident. The Court of Appeals also correctly determined that the evidence cited by 
ShopKo in its brief did not justify instructing the jury to reduce damages based on 
symptomatic preexisting conditions, and that the error was harmful. Finally, the Court of 
Appeals' decision can be affirmed on the ground that the district court improperly 
instructed the jury to reduce Wendy's future damages award to present value even though 
there was no evidence that would have enabled the jury to make such a calculation. This 
Court should therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY STATED UTAH LAW IN HOLDING THAT A 
DEFENDANT PROXIMATELY CAUSES ALL DAMAGES THAT RESULT FROM 
AGGRAVATION OF PREEXISTING CONDITIONS THAT ARE DORMANT AT THE TIME 
OF THE ACCIDENT. 
In concluding that the district court improperly instructed the jury regarding 
apportioning damages between those caused by the ShopKo incident and those caused by 
9 
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preexisting conditions, the Court of Appeals relied on Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 
(Utah App. 1987) for the proposition that "a victim with latent, dormant, or otherwise 
asymptomatic preexisting conditions stands on equal footing with a victim with no 
preexisting conditions; the tortfeasor is liable for the full amount of resulting damages 
when its conduct aggravates or 'lights up' an asymptomatic preexisting condition." (Op. f 
17.) The Court of Appeals reasoned, based on that proposition, that "the crucial question 
[in determining whether the jury could reduce damages based on preexisting injuries] is 
whether Harris's preexisting conditions were, on the date of the accident, latent, dormant 
or asymptomatic." (Op. \ 23.) In its order granting certiorari review {see fflf 4 and 2, 
respectively), this Court asks the parties to brief the question of whether the portions of 
the opinion quoted above constitute correct statements of Utah Law. Harris contends that 
they are. 
A. It is well-settled law that a defendant is liable for the full amount of 
damages that result from aggravation of preexisting conditions that are 
dormant at the time of the accident. 
In support of its holding that a defendant is liable for the full amount of damages 
that result from aggravation of preexisting conditions that are dormant at the time of the 
accident, the Court of Appeals cited the following language in Biswell v. Duncan: 
The rule is well settled that when a defendant's negligence aggravates or 
lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or one to which the 
injured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to the injured person 
for the full amount of damages which ensue, notwithstanding such diseased 
or weakened condition. In other words, when a latent condition itself does 
not cause pain, but that condition plus an injury brings on pain by 
aggravating the preexisting condition, then the injury, not the dormant 
condition, is the proximate cause of the pain and disability. 
10 
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Biswell, 742 P.2d at 88. The foregoing statement is a correct extrapolation of the 
eggshell-skull plaintiff rule, the scope of which is succinctly and comprehensively laid 
out in the Second Circuit's opinion in Maurer v. United States: 
It is a settled principle of tort law that when a defendant's wrongful act 
causes injury, he is fully liable for the resulting damage even though the 
injured plaintiff had a preexisting condition that made the consequences of 
the wrongful act more severe than they would have been for a normal 
victim. The defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him. A plaintiffs 
recovery for damages caused by a defendant's wrongful act may not be 
proportionately reduced because of a preexisting weakness or susceptibility 
to injury . . . or a weakness caused by a previous injury. 
Maurer v. United States, 668 F.2d 98, 99-100, (2d Cir. 1981) (citations omitted); see 
Tingey v. Chrstensen, 1999 UT 68, % 14, 987 P.2d 588; Ryan v. Gold Cross Svc, Inc., 
903 P.2d 423, 428 (Utah 1995).4 As suggested by the phrase "a weakness caused by a 
previous injury," an injury that was previously symptomatic but has resolved is a latent 
condition under this rule. See, e.g., Maurer, 668 F.2d at 100; Buchalski v. United Marine 
Corp., 393 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 
1064 & n.5 (Mass. 1978); Bennett v. Messick, 457 P.2d 609, 612 (Wash. 1969). The 
eggshell-skull plaintiff rule is followed by every jurisdiction in the United States, see 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 31, Reporters' Note, cmt. b (2010) 
(citing cases), and is advocated by commentators as promoting a proper allocation of 
resources to safety and care. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic 
4. For further explanation of the eggshell-skull plaintiff rule, see Restatement 
(Third), supra, § 31; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 461 (1965); 22 Am. Jur. 2d 
Damages § 239 (2012); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser andKeeton on The Law of Torts 
§ 43 (5th ed. 1984) 
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Structure of Tort Law 249-50 (1987); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of 
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 92, 95-98 (1975). 
ShopKo does not offer any authority from Utah or any other jurisdiction that 
would cast doubt on the correctness of the rule stated in Biswell that a defendant is liable 
for the full amount of damages that result from aggravation of preexisting conditions that 
are dormant at the time of the accident. Rather, ShopKo's point of disagreement with 
Biswell seems based on its erroneous perception that Biswell forecloses the possibility of 
an asymptomatic condition becoming symptomatic independently of the accident at issue. 
ShopKo argues that the Court of Appeals' statement in Biswell that a plaintiff "is entitled 
to recover all damages which actually and necessarily follow the injury," ignores the 
question of causation, noting that "it is not axiomatic that all damages which follow an 
injury will be the result of an the accident." (Br. Pet'r 20.)5 It is true that a plaintiff must 
show causation-in-fact, and Biswell does not ignore this, as shown by the sentence 
immediately before the sentence ShopKo chose to quote: "when a latent condition itself 
does not cause pain, but that condition plus an injury brings on pain by aggravating the 
preexisting condition, then the injury, not the dormant condition, is the proximate cause 
of the pain and disability." Biswell, 742 P.2d at 88 (emphasis added). Thus the word 
"follow" in the portion of Biswell ShopKo references does not mean "to come or take 
place after in time, sequence, or order," but rather "to come into existence or take place 
5. See also Br. Pet'r 21-22 ("A preexisting condition may begin to be painful after an 
accident because of its own advancing condition, independent of the accident. . . . The 
fact that a preexisting condition is not painful 'on the date of the accident' and the 
plaintiff feels pain after the accident does not establish causation."). 
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as a result or consequence of." See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 442 (1980 ed.) 
(defining "follow"). 
The law in Biswell is consistent with the well-accepted law in Utah and all other 
jurisdictions and states the correct standard for determining whether a defendant may 
reduce damages for a preexisting condition. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was correct 
in relying on Biswell and applying its principles to this case. 
B. The Court of Appeals correctly held that, for a jury to reduce damages 
based on preexisting injuries, Utah law requires evidence that would 
allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the preexisting condition was 
symptomatic at the time of the injury. 
While the eggshell-skull plaintiff rule prevents a defendant from using the 
foreseeability doctrine to limit the scope of its liability, the rule still requires that the 
plaintiff show that the defendant's negligence was the cause-in-fact of plaintiff s injuries. 
This causation requirement gives rise to the widely recognized limitation on the eggshell-
skull plaintiff rule that "when a plaintiff is incapacitated or disabled prior to an accident, 
the defendant is liable only for the additional harm or aggravation that he caused." 
Maurer, 668 F.2d at 100; see Robinson v. All Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109, ffif 10-15, 
992 P.2d 969; Restatement (Third), supra, § 31, cmt. c. Therefore, once a plaintiff has 
presented sufficient evidence to establish a causal link between the injury and the 
"lighting up" of an asymptomatic preexisting condition, it falls on the defendant to 
present evidence of one or more of the above limitations in order to allow the jury to 
apportion damages. Because Harris presented sufficient evidence to establish the causal 
link between the injury and the "lighting up" of asymptomatic preexisting conditions (Tr. 
235:25-236:23; 244:24-245:9), the Court of Appeals correctly held that "the crucial 
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question" in determining whether the district court erred in instructing the jury to reduce 
damages based on preexisting injuries is whether there is sufficient evidence to allow a 
reasonable juror to conclude that the plaintiffs preexisting condition was symptomatic at 
the time of the injury at issue. 
ShopKo argues that the Court of Appeals unduly limited a defendant's ability to 
put on evidence that a plaintiffs preexisting conditions were symptomatic by limiting the 
relevant time frame "to a single day, the day of the accident." (Br. Pet. 18-19.) ShopKo 
misinterprets the Court of Appeals' opinion. While the Court of Appeals correctly 
identified that the relevant question was "whether Harris's preexisting conditions were, 
on the date of the accident, latent, dormant or asymptomatic," the opinion does not state 
that only evidence from the date of the injury is relevant to determine whether an 
accident victim's preexisting conditions were symptomatic on the date of the injury. A 
great deal of evidence would be relevant to the question of whether an accident victim's 
preexisting conditions were symptomatic at the time of the accident: evidence of 
treatment for a condition near the time of the accident, evidence of a chronic condition 
that had not resolved, or that one would not expect to resolve, prior to the accident, 
evidence of taking prescription pain medicine, testimony of acquaintances that the victim 
had complained about her condition, and so on. None of this evidence would be barred 
from consideration by the Court of Appeals' opinion. 
It appears that the root of ShopKo's confusion regarding the Court of Appeals' 
opinion is the meaning of the term "asymptomatic," as the term could be used both to 
describe a temporary cessation of symptoms and a permanent resolution of symptoms. 
The Court of Appeals makes it clear that it is referring to the latter meaning when it 
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concludes that it saw "no evidence capable of supporting a jury finding that Harris's 
preexisting complains . . . were anything but—to borrow BiswelFs phrase—'taken care 
of by the time of the accident." (Op. ^ 24.)6 As explained by the Utah Association for 
Justice, if a trial court determines there is sufficient evidence to raise a dispute of fact 
about whether a previously symptomatic preexisting condition had permanently resolved 
before the accident, then the question should be for the jury to decide, and both 
apportionment and eggshell-skull plaintiff instructions should be given. (Amicus Br. UAJ 
10-13.) 
However, in this case there was not sufficient evidence to give that question to the 
jury. As explained in Point II.A, infra, The uncontested evidence was that at the time of 
the accident, all of Wendy's preexisting conditions had either not yet surfaced or had 
long since resolved. Therefore, the question of what evidence is sufficient to let the jury 
decide the question of whether a plaintiff is symptomatic or asymptomatic at the time of 
the injury was not before the Court of Appeals and need not be decided by this Court. 
This Court should affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
6. To answer ShopKo's parenthetical question (Br. Pet. 18), "taken care o f in this 
context does indeed mean that previously symptomatic conditions have stabilized and 
resolved to the point that they will not cause the accident victim pain on their own. This 
understanding of the phrase "taken care o f also resolves any apparent tension between 
the Court of Appeals' opinion and this Court's conclusion in Tingeythat evidence of pain 
from preexisting conditions 25 days before the accident was sufficient to allow the jury to 
find that the plaintiff was symptomatic at the time of the injury. Tingey, 1999 UT 68, 
Iff 3, 7-9. 
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO APPORTION DAMAGES 
BETWEEN THE INJURIES CAUSED BY THE ACCIDENT AND PREEXISTING 
CONDITIONS, 
ShopKo also argues in its brief that the Court of Appeals erred both in 
determining that instructing the jury as to apportionment was error, and in determining 
that this error was harmful. While ShopKo lists a barrage of evidence in support of its 
goal,7 it does not attempt to analyze the import of the evidence and tell this Court why the 
Court of Appeals was wrong in ignoring or discounting this evidence. In fact, the Court 
of Appeals was right in determining that there was no evidence that supported instructing 
the jury as to apportionment, and the low amount of economic and non-economic 
damages, as well as the prejudicial and confusing nature of the evidence of asymptomatic 
conditions strongly supports the conclusion that the error was prejudicial. 
A. There was no evidence presented at trial that Wendy's preexisting 
conditions were symptomatic at the time of the accident. 
In its brief, ShopKo points to several preexisting conditions that it contends that 
Wendy had before the accident. As the Court of Appeals noted, "[t]hese statements, 
though accurate as far as they go, do not respond to Harris's central point" (Op. j^ 22), 
which is that "while the evidence of Harris's preexisting conditions was substantial, none 
of it is capable of supporting a jury finding that those conditions were symptomatic on 
the date of the accident." (Op. K 21.) The evidence referred to in ShopKo's brief does not 
7. ShopKo is so zealous in this task that it repeats itself over and over, citing to the 
same testimony multiple times, (3, 34 and 35; 5 and 36; 7 and 42; 8 and 43; 23 and 39;) 
citing testimony as it was given on direct and repeated later by the same witness, (1 and 
37; 23, 31 and 39;) and citing to multiple doctors reading the same record (5,6,8, and 36; 
11 and 46). 
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present anything that has not already been thoroughly refuted in the briefs filed with the 
Court of Appeals. While Harris has previously marshaled all evidence that could be 
construed in favor of the trial court's decision before the Court of Appeals (Op. ^  21), she 
will only respond to the evidence that ShopKo contends is relevant in its brief. For the 
most part, Harris has used ShopKo's words to address the evidence except where that 
phrasing substantially misrepresents the record evidence.8 
• Dr. Colledge testified that Wendy had a suspect annular tear and disc bulge, which 
is generally caused by degeneration of the disks due to aging. He observed 
desiccation of Wendy's spinal disks, which can be "the result of just the natural 
aging process" and is not "typically the result of a single incident of trauma." He 
testified that Ms. Harris suffered low back pain consistent with degenerative 
disease, and that degenerative disk disease, along with facet disease, could be the 
cause of Plaintiff s current complaints. Dr. Rosenthal testified that his first 
diagnosis after the ShopKo incident was facet joint syndrome, a condition that can 
be caused by degeneration due to aging and is not always trauma related. Dr. 
Colledge testified that Harris suffered from facet disease, which is the wear of the 
joints in the spine, and manifests itself as back pain. (See Pet. Br. 8:19-9:7; 10:11-
14; 12:1-3, 5-12, 14-15.) 
There was no evidence that Wendy had symptomatic degenerative disc disease 
immediately prior to the accident. Dr. Rosenthal stated that her 2009 MRI had no 
evidence of degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 308:19-309:1.) The report from Dr. Gardner in 
2006 was that he did not see annular tear or degenerative collapse, but "some early 
degenerative changes consistent with her age." (Tr. 545:7-16.) Three different 
radiologists looked at her reports and did not note degenerative disc disease, even though 
that is something that radiologists routinely report. (Tr. 605:9-610:l.)9 The diagnosis of 
annular tear was never confirmed. (Tr. 593:11-24; 611:22-612:3.) In cross-examination, it 
8. See infra notes 10-12, 15-18. 
9. To be fair, the lack of degenerative disc disease on the radiology reports does not 
mean that it was not present on the MRI films. (Tr. 640:25-641:6.) 
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became clear that Dr. Colledge did not know whether it was the L4-L5 disc or the L5-S1 
disc that was degenerating. (Tr. 612:4-617:11.) 
Dr. Rosenthal testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it was more 
likely than not that Wendy's pain and injuries, including facet joint syndrome, were 
caused by the accident at ShopKo. (Tr. 235:25- 236:23; 244:24-245:9) Dr. Colledge 
testified that facet disease can be brought about by a single incident of trauma, (Tr. 
583:7-13) and that he believed that her injuries were at least partly due to trauma. 
(584:23-25.) He testified that it was possible that degenerative disc disease was not a 
cause of her injuries. (Tr. 618:7-12.) Most importantly, Dr. Colledge testified that it is not 
uncommon for degenerative disc disease to be asymptomatic, then flare up after a 
traumatic event. (Tr. 641:25-643:7.) 
• Dr. Rosenthal testified that the pain form Ms. Harris facet syndrome had resolved, 
but she is still suffering from coccydynia, which is a separate pain generator. 
Coccydinia is caused by overuse. (Pet. Br. 12:18-20.) 
Contrary to ShopKo's assertion, Dr. Rosenthal did not testify that Wendy's 
coccydinia was caused by overuse; rather, he said that coccydinia is difficult to treat, as 
sitting down keeps the tailbone inflamed and prevents it from healing. (Tr. 232:4-13.) Dr. 
Rosenthal testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it was more likely 
than not that Wendy's pain and injuries were caused by the accident at ShopKo. (Tr. 
235:25-236:23; 244:24-245:9.) 
• In July of 2002, Wendy visited Alta View Hospital and was diagnosed with "left 
leg pain and questionable sciatica." Dr. Scuderi testified that radiating pain is a 
symptom of sciatica, and that Wendy had radiating leg pain after the ShopKo 
accident. Dr. Colledge testified that Ms. Harris suffered radiating leg pain, and that 
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her history of possible sciatica could "play a role in some of the lower back issues 
she was having and complaining of at the time." (Pet. Br. 9:8-17; 12:5-8,12-13.)10 
There was no evidence that Wendy had symptomatic sciatica immediately prior to 
her accident at ShopKo. The only report of "questionable sciatica" was in 2002, almost 
four years before the accident. (Tr. 588:10-14.) There was no expert opinion as to what 
extent any preexisting sciatica contributed to her injury, or for that matter, that it 
contributed at all to her injuries. Dr. Colledge testified that Wendy might not have had 
sciatica at all before the accident. (Tr. 632:25-633:9.) 
• Dr. Rodney Scuderi was asked to consider past medical records, including a 1998 
record indicating cervical strain and discussing disk herniation, a 2001 record 
showing diffused neck pain following a vehicle accident, and a 2002 record 
indicating "excruciating discomfort in the lumbar area." After reviewing those 
records Dr. Scuderi admitted that "it would appear" that Ms. Harris had a 
preexisting history of neck and back pain (Pet. Br. 9:13-17; 13:3-9.)n 
There was no evidence that Wendy had symptomatic neck pain immediately prior 
to the ShopKo accident. (Tr. 410:20-411:2.) Wendy never received any treatment for 
back pain from the motor vehicle accident. (Tr. 241:9-12.) She has never complained of 
or was treated for neck pain as part of the ShopKo accident. (Tr. 377:14-17; 410:20-
411:2.) Also, there was no opinion testimony that her prior neck injuries were a cause of 
her pain. (Tr. 393:2-5.) 
10. Contrary to ShopKo's assertion (Pet. Br. 9:10-11), Dr. Scuderi did not testify that 
he treated Wendy for sciatica in 2002 or that he ever diagnosed her with sciatica before 
the accident. 
11. Contrary to ShopKo's assertion (Pet. Br. 13:3-6), Dr. Scuderi actually testified that 
his examination of Wendy indicated that her pain was not consistent with chronic 
preexisting pain. (Tr. 387:14-18.) He also testified that there was nothing in the medical 
records that would indicate chronic preexisting back pain. (Tr. 388:21-392:1.) 
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The uncontested evidence was that the prior episode of lower back pain resolved 
on its own about four years before the accident at ShopKo. (Tr. 239:2-17; 629:9-17.) 
Wendy received no therapy for this incident and no MRI was done. (Tr. 239:2-240:22.) 
There was no opinion testimony that this incident was related to her injuries. In fact, 
Defendant's witness, Dr. Colledge, testified that an injury from four years before would 
not have anything to do with her present back pain. (Tr. 631:24-632:18.) 
There is evidence in Wendy's medical records that she had fibromyalgia sometime 
prior to the accident. Fibromyalgia can manifest itself in muscle aches and lower 
back pain. Dr. Hogenson testified that fibromyalgia is indicated by chronic pains 
in the muscles, causes fatigue, sleep problems, painful and tender points at certain 
parts of the body, all symptoms of which Harris is currently complaining. (Pet. Br. 
10:1-2; 13:14-19.)12 
There was no evidence that Wendy had symptomatic fibromyalgia immediately 
prior to the accident. The records that had "fibromyalgia" written on them include a self-
assessment of "achy" and did not indicate that there was a physical examination to 
confirm the diagnosis. (Tr. 241:19-242:5.) It is not uncommon for doctors to mistakenly 
use the word fibromyalgia when they just mean muscle aches. (Tr. 241:22-242:3.) Dr. 
Colledge also testified that fibromyalgia is not well understood and is often 
misdiagnosed. (Tr. 634:8-17.) The latest record of fibromyalgia is over three years before 
the accident at ShopKo. (Tr. 242:4-17.) Dr. Rosenthal stated that he did not believe that 
her injuries were due to fibromyalgia. (Tr. 242:18-21.) Dr. Hogenson did not testify that 
he believes Wendy had fibromyalgia or that it was a cause in any of her injuries. He was 
not aware of any pain medication or other treatment that she was taking for fibromyalgia 
12. Contrary to ShopKo's assertion (Pet. Br. 13:14-16), Dr. Hogenson did not testify 
that Wendy "suffered from fibromyalgia." 
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prior to the accident. (Tr. 365:5-8.) There was no opinion testimony that fibromyalgia 
was a cause of her injuries. 
Wendy indicated that she had arthritis on a 2007 MRI report. Kay Whittaker 
testified that Harris suffered from "SI Joint dysfunction," which can be caused by 
degenerative arthritis. (Pet. Br. 13:19-14:5.) 
There is no indication from the single record that Wendy was ever independently 
diagnosed with arthritis, or where the supposed arthritis was located. There was never 
any evidence put on to show that she was ever diagnosed with degenerative arthritis. 
There was no evidence that she was ever treated or took any medicine for arthritis before 
the accident at ShopKo. There was no evidence that her arthritis had any connection with 
her injuries. There was no expert opinion as to what extent any preexisting arthritis 
contributed to her injury, if at all. 
• Dr. Colledge testified that Plaintiffs pain was chronic. Kay Whittaker diagnosed 
Ms. Harris as suffering from chronic pain. (Pet. Br. 11:3-4; 14:6.) 
Both of these diagnoses were after the ShopKo accident. Dr. Colledge testified 
that "chronic pain" is pain that persists more than eight weeks after the injury. (Tr. 584:9-
11.) The uncontested evidence was that Wendy was not suffering from lower-back 
problems immediately prior to the accident, (Tr. 240:23-241:1; 389:10-392:4; 572:7-14; 
650:21-24; 670:17-671:5) and that she had never been treated for chronic back problems 
or chronic pain at any time. (Tr. 349:20-350:1; 365:5-8; 515:17-516:2; 670:17- 671:5.) 
In short, while there was evidence that Wendy suffered from preexisting 
conditions, there was no evidence that any of those were symptomatic at the time of the 
injury, and the uncontested evidence is that those preexisting conditions had been "lit up" 
by the accident at ShopKo. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding 
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that the jury should not have been instructed to apportion damages between the injury and 
preexisting conditions. 
B. There is no evidence that Wendy's injuries or pain arose independently of 
the accident at ShopKo. 
For the first time on this appeal, ShopKo contends that there is evidence that 
Wendy's pain and injuries arose independently of the accident caused by ShopKo's 
negligence. There is no expert testimony that would support that conclusion. Moreover, 
this theory would not be consistent with the jury verdict—as the jury awarded future 
damages for treating Wendy's back and tailbone problems, they must have believed that 
these injuries were caused by the accident. If the jury had believed that the accident had 
only caused temporary pain and Wendy's facet joint syndrome and coccydinia were not 
activated by the accident, they would not have awarded future damages for treating these 
injuries. ShopKo can only come up with three bits of evidence that it says would support 
this conclusion. As the following paragraphs make clear, none of these pieces of evidence 
are adequate for a jury to conclude that Wendy's injuries arose independently from the 
accident. 
• Dr. Colledge could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that 
Harris' injuries were related to the ShopKo incident. (Pet. Br. 11:4-5; 12:3-5, 17-
18.) 
13. It is unclear whether ShopKo's argument is that the accident at ShopKo played no 
part in activating Wendy's injuries or that the injuries, while activated by the accident, 
deteriorated further as time went on. For purposes of this brief, Harris will assume that 
ShopKo is arguing the former, as the latter argument would not exclude it from liability 
under the eggshell-skull plaintiff rule. See Restatement (Third), supra, § 31, cmt. b, illus. 
1. 
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There was no indication whether he could not testify to this because the evidence 
was not there, or if it was because had not done sufficient examination of the causal data. 
His testimony seems to indicate the latter. Dr. Colledge was asked twice about causation. 
The first time he said, "No. We just report the news. We don't make it. We don't know 
where it comes from." (Tr. 575:5-6.) The second time he said, "I can't. Just, again, 
identify that the pathology exists. Causation is why you're here." (Tr. 585:13-14.) Given 
that he stated that her injuries were at least partly due to trauma, (Tr. 584:23-25) his 
failure to testify as to causation cannot be treated as affirmative evidence that the jury 
could consider alongside Dr. Rosenthal's testimony as to causation. Finally, even if Dr. 
Colledge's testimony were an affirmative statement, it would justify a no-cause verdict 
for failure to prove causation, not a reduction in award. It therefore cannot be used to 
justify the verdict. 
• While Dr. Colledge agreed that the ShopKo incident caused soft tissue damage, he 
testified that the pain associated with the soft tissue injury could be expected to 
heal after three to six weeks. (Pet. Br. 11:5-8.) 
This is false—Dr. Colledge actually testified that the tissue healing has taken place 
within that amount of time, but said nothing about the pain. (Tr. 586:10-19.) Moreover, 
the expected time for healing is irrelevant, as the uncontradicted evidence was that 
Wendy's pain was real. (Tr. 601:6-602:13.) A tortfeasor takes its victim as it finds her, 
and cannot seek to reduce damages by offering testimony that the victim was unusually 
fragile. See Ryan, 903 P.2d at 428. 
Harris herself admitted that she suffered no back pain right after the ShopKo 
incident, and there was evidence that after the ShopKo incident she continued to 
perform her normal activities and that her condition became worse over time. Mr. 
Harris testified that right after the incident Wendy continued to work and to 
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perform normal activities, but that her condition declined over time. (Pet. Br. 14:7-
14.) 
The uncontested evidence was that pain from a "sudden jarring type of injury" 
often starts as general body aches, then after a period of time begins to localize. (Tr. 
244:9-23; 379:18-21.) This is consistent with Wendy's experience—her pain localized a 
few days after the accident. (Tr. 695:15-23, 696:13-697:8, 697:15-23.) The 
uncontradicted testimony was that, although Wendy was in pain, she tried for a time to 
keep her normal schedule, but reached the end of her endurance and had to give up. (Tr. 
683:5-16; 699:25-701:19.) 
C. There was no evidence presented at trial that would have provided the 
jury with a reasonable basis for apportioning Wendy9s injuries between 
the accident and preexisting conditions. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that giving CV2018 was in error 
could also be sustained because there was no expert testimony that would have allowed 
the jury to reasonably apportion damages between the injury and symptomatic 
preexisting conditions. For a defendant to reduce damages based on a symptomatic 
preexisting condition, it must show "a reasonable basis for determining the contribution 
of each cause to a single harm." Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109 at ^ f 12. 
It is the trial court's responsibility to determine whether there has been sufficient 
evidence presented for the jury to apportion between harms. See Restatement (Second), 
supra, § 434. If the defendant has not presented sufficient evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for apportionment, "the courts have refused to make an arbitrary 
apportionment for its own sake, and each of the causes is charged with responsibility for 
the entire harm." Robinson, 1999 UT 109 at f 12. 
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While the apportionment does not need to be exact, a reasonable basis for 
apportionment requires more than just the common-experience of lay persons; there must 
be some evidence upon which the jury can rely in determining a percentage for 
apportionment. See Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 528 A.2d 947, 950-51 
(Pa. 1987) ("[T]he jury cannot be expected to draw conclusions which medical experts, 
relying on the same evidence, could not draw . . . .any apportionment by the jury in this 
case was a result of speculation and conjecture."). A reasonable basis for apportionment 
can be provided by expert medical testimony, as well as epidemiological data. See Dafler 
v. Raymark Industries, 611 A.2d 136, 146 (N.J. Super. 1992) (holding that evidence that 
exposure to asbestos increases the risk of lung cancer in the general population five-fold, 
and smoking increases the risk ten-fold, was sufficient to permit apportionment). 
However, evidence that a preexisting condition was likely a contributing factor to a 
plaintiffs injury, see Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores, 209 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000), 
and evidence that a plaintiffs injury was expected to heal within six months, see id, is 
not sufficient evidence to provide a basis for apportioning damages. 
In this case, there was no expert testimony or epidemiological data comparing 
Wendy's injuries and preexisting conditions. There was no comparison data, as Wendy 
was in no pain before the accident. There was therefore no evidence that would have 
supported reducing apportioning damages, and so the Court of Appeals was correct in 
holding that giving CV2018 was improper. 
D. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the error was harmful. 
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In undertaking their harmful error analysis, the Court of Appeals correctly noted 
that "we may reverse a trial court judgment only if there is a reasonable likelihood that, 
absent the error, there would have been a result more favorable to the complaining 
party."14 (Op. ^  25.) The Court of Appeals properly analyzed how the error was 
significant to the case as a whole, see State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992), 
and determined that the error was harmful based on "the nature and volume of the 
evidence concerning Harris's preexisting conditions, the lack of evidence indicating that 
those conditions were symptomatic at the time of the accident, and the level of the 
damage awards." (Op. 125.) 
This was both proper procedure and substantively correct. As a general principle, 
the lower the award is, the more likely that additional favorable evidence or instructions 
would translate into a higher award for damages, and thus, it is more likely that any given 
14. In its brief, ShopKo misstates the standard for determining harmful error, 
confusing it with the standard for determining sufficiency of damages under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 59(a)(5)-(a)(6). (Br. Pet'r 24.) See Myer v. H.H. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558, 560 
(Utah 1984); Sprunt v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 340 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1959); 
Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1978) (all discussing sufficiency of the 
amount of damages). 
ShopKo also criticizes the Court of Appeals for stating that "it is impossible to 
analyze how the jury came to award $1000 in general damages. It is equally impossible to 
know why the jury reduced Harris' claimed economic damages by two-thirds" and that 
"had the improper instruction not been given, the jury might have awarded more 
damages." (Br. Pet'r 24, quoting Op. ^ 25.) The language that ShopKo finds 
objectionable is quoted verbatim from this Court's opinion in Robinson v. All Star 
Delivery Inc., 1999 UT 109 at \ 18. Moreover, the Court of Appeals quotation of this 
Court's language does not indicate that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard 
in determining harmful error, especially since it had quoted the correct standard earlier in 
its that same paragraph. {See Op. Tf 25 ("However, 'we may reverse a trial court judgment 
only if there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a 
result more favorable to the complaining party.'").) 
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error would be harmful. In this case, the damages awards of one-third of requested 
medical expenses and $1,000 in noneconomic damages were very low, and given the 
great amount of focus placed on preexisting conditions at trial, there was ample reason to 
believe that the verdict would have been different absent the trial court's error. 
As a comparison, consider this Court's decision in Robinson v. All- Star Delivery, 
Inc. As in this matter, the plaintiff in Robinson was awarded $1,000.00 in general 
damages. See 1999 UT 109 at |^ 8. However, the similarities end there. In Robinson, the 
plaintiff only suffered $3,800.00 in economic damages. See id. at \ 4. The plaintiff 
testified that while he felt pain in his neck, back and leg after the accident, the neck pain 
resolved after a two weeks, and the leg pain resolved one year later, after he underwent a 
surgery that was recommended before the accident giving rise to the suit. See id. at ^ 7. 
He further testified that while his back pain still existed three years later, the pain had not 
caused him to miss work, did not interfere with most major life activities, and did not 
warrant the expense of epidural injections that would have been 70-80% successful in 
reducing his back pain. See id. The plaintiff stopped seeing his doctor one month after the 
accident, and stopped going to physical therapy three months after the accident. See id. 
The plaintiffs doctor rated the severity of his back sprain as one out of four, one being 
the most mild. See id. \ 5. 
Notwithstanding the paucity of the evidence of pain and suffering, this Court 
stated that because there was conflicting evidence as to whether the damage caused by 
preexisting injuries was apportionable, there was a reasonable likelihood that if the jury 
did not believe that they were required to apportion damages to a preexisting injury, they 
may have awarded more in general damages. See id. \ 18. Given the much higher level of 
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both medical expenses and evidence of pain and suffering in this case, the decision in 
Robinson justifies (and perhaps even compels) a finding of harmfiil error in this case. 
In supporting its argument that there was no harmful error, ShopKo argues that 
many of the treatments were not reasonable and necessary, and that testimony as to future 
damages was too speculative. Neither of these statements are consistent with Utah law. 
Utah law provides for the recovery of medical expenses if they were reasonably 
necessary. See Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 981 (Utah 1993); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 924 (1979). Whether an expense is reasonably necessary 
is not determined retrospectively by whether the treatment was actually successful, but 
rather whether a reasonably prudent person in a similar situation would have undertaken 
a similar act. See Restatement (Second), supra, § 919 cmts. b & c„ Further, the amount of 
future damages "may be based upon approximations, if . . . the approximations are based 
upon reasonable assumptions or projections." Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States 
Tel & Tel Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985). Once Plaintiff has established an 
approximation of future damages, it is up to the Defendant to provide affirmative 
evidence that an alternate figure is more likely. See Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 1120-
21 (Utah App. 1987). As the following paragraphs show, the jury could not have 
reasonably found that Wendy's past or future care was not reasonably necessary. 
• Dr. Colledge challenged the necessary and reasonable nature of the nerve burning 
treatment, chiropractic and massage therapy, and testified that future use of pain 
pills should be curtailed. (Pet. Br. 11:15-19.) 
Although Dr. Colledge was critical of these therapies, he never stated that any 
treatment was not reasonable and necessary in Wendy's case. The opinion of both Dr. 
Colledge and Dr. Rosentthal was that if it increases function, treating pain using pain 
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medicine and other "passive treatments" is reasonable. (Tr. 340:2-341:3; 627:9-629:5.) 
Also, Dr. Colledge never stated that Wendy's use of pain medication was unreasonable— 
just that it should not be taken unless it improves function. (Tr. 586:24-587:13.) The 
uncontested evidence at trial was that the massage therapy, chiropractic and pain 
medicine increased Wendy's function and quality of life. (Tr. 217:2-8; 219:12-14; 
345:25-346:9; 378:7-16; 400:2-8; 699:2-19.) 
Dr. Rosenthal testified that he was not positive as to Wendy's future treatment— 
he referred to it as "looking into a crystal ball." He further testified that his 
projection for future pain medication followed a "worst-case scenario," and that 
Wendy's future medical needs may be more or less than the treatment plan he 
outlined. (Pet. Br. 10:15-11:2.)15 
This statement is irrelevant. As stated earlier, it is not Plaintiffs burden to provide 
absolute certainty with respect to the amount of future damages. Dr. Rosenthal testified to 
a degree of medical certainty that it was more probable than not that her future medical 
needs were as he stated. (Tr. 246:17-247:3; 326:5-15.) Further, his comment about 
following a "worst-case scenario" was only in the context of her only getting partial pain 
relief, not the amount of medicine she would need. (Tr. 324:4-325:14.) He testified that 
she may need more pain medicine than his projections, but the scenario he presented to 
the jury was his "best assessment." (Tr. 325:25-326:13.) As explained previously, 
15. ShopKo's assertion that Dr. Rosenthal "could not testify with certainty that Harris 
would need dilaudid in the future" (Pet. Br. 10:18-20) is false. ShopKo's counsel asked 
Dr. Rosenthal this very question at trial, and he denied it. (Tr. 325:1-4.) Dr. Rosenthal 
stated that there was "no way to tell for certain" what dose Wendy needed, (Tr. 250:20-
21) but it was his "medical opinion" that she would need dilaudid in the future, (Tr. 
246:17-21) and he believed that assessment was true "to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability." (Tr. 326-5-13.) 
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Defendant cannot refute this testimony without providing evidence that an alternative 
amount of damages is more likely. 
Dr. Rosenthal testified that if a diagnosis had been rendered earlier, Wendy's care 
"would have been different," and it was "probable" that the intervening care 
would not have been necessary. (Pet. Br. 10:5-11 .)16 
Dr. Colledge testified that Wendy's treatment with chiropractic and massage 
therapy is not the kind of treatment which is going to give her the relief she is 
looking for, and that medical scientific evidence shows that massage therapy and 
chiropractic care will not offer long-term relief. Wendy received 51 chiropractic 
treatment sessions and 27 massage therapy sessions, but did not receive any 
lasting relief from these treatments. (Pet. Br. 11:9-12; 12:19-13:2, 10-13.)17 
These statements are irrelevant from a legal standpoint. As stated earlier, whether 
a medical treatment was reasonably necessary is not determined by looking at an ideal 
outcome, but rather what a reasonable person would do given the same information and 
circumstances. Dr. Rosenthal testified that sometimes low-back conditions resolve with 
chiropractic or physical therapy. (Tr. 331:2-25.) He further testified that, given the fact 
that the facet joint syndrome and coccydinia had not yet been discovered, he had no 
issues with the prior treatment and thought it was appropriate. (Tr. 311:1-7; 312:14-20; 
331:19-25.) Wendy went to see a physician and followed his advice. She went to massage 
therapy based on a doctor's recommendation. (Tr. 345:3-11.) She took pain medicine 
based upon a prescription. (Tr. 520:9-12.) The massage therapy, chiropractic and pain 
16. ShopKo's assertion that Dr. Rosenthal testified that Wendy's prior care was 
inadequate (Pet. Br. 10:5-7) is false. In the portion of the record ShopKo refers to, Dr. 
Rosenthal stated: "Other than the fact that she was never provided a diagnosis I believe 
that her care was appropriate in regards to being symptomatic care." (Tr. 312:17-21.) 
17. ShopKo's assertion that Dr. Colledge testified that there is no scientific support for 
massage therapy and chiropractic care (Pet. Br. 11:11-12) is false. Dr. Colledge actually 
said that massage therapy and chiropractic would not cure Wendy's injuries, but would 
provide short-term relief. (Tr. 594:14-15.) 
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medicine increased her function and quality of life. (Tr. 217:2-8; 219:12-14; 345:25-
346:9; 378:7-16; 400:2-8; 699:2-19.) The uncontested testimony was that if it increases 
function, treating pain using pain medicine and other "passive treatments" is reasonable. 
(Tr. 340:2-341:3; 587:8-13; 627:9-629:5.) Finally, there was no testimony that these 
expenses were not medically necessary. 
• Dr. Colledge testified that radio frequency treatments do not treat the injury and 
provides only "short-term relief in about half the patients." (Pet. Br. 11:12-14.) 
This statement is contradicted by the great weight of the evidence, as Plaintiff 
testified that the treatment actually worked (Tr. 709:16-710:16), and Dr. Rosenthal 
testified that it was likely that after seven years, the nerve would stop growing. (Tr. 
249:7-25.) Dr. Colledge did not address this evidence. 
• Dr. Rosenthal testified that Wendy regularly finished her thirty-day prescription 
for dilaudid in less than thirty days. (Pet. Br. 10:3-5.)18 
• Dr. Colledge testified that Harris should "hold off on her future use of dilaudid. 
(Pet. Br. 11:15-19.) 
These statements are also irrelevant, as the uncontradicted evidence was that her 
usage of dilaudid was reasonably necessary, (Tr. 245:18-246:14) and that any 
dependence that Wendy had on pain medicine was a result of her accident at ShopKo. 
(Tr. 254:23-255:14.) Dr. Colledge never stated that Wendy's use of pain medication was 
unreasonable—just that it should not be taken unless it improves function. (Tr. 586:24-
18. ShopKo's assertion that Dr. Rosenthal testified that Wendy had overused dilaudid 
(Pet. Br. 10:3-5) is misleading. Dr. Rosenthal did not state that Wendy had "overused" 
dilaudid. Dr. Rosenthal testified that Wendy regularly finished her thirty-day prescription 
for pain killers in less than thirty days, (Tr. 253:15-22) but he could not form an opinion 
as to whether Wendy was addicted to dilaudid, (Tr. 252:17-253:6) and did not testify that 
she abused dialudid or used it in an unsafe fashion. 
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587:13.) The uncontested evidence was that the pain medication improved Wendy's 
function(Tr. 345:25-346:9), which was Dr. Colledge's standard for a reasonable 
treatment. (Tr. 587:8-13.) Dr. Hogenson testified that Wendy was not addicted to pain 
medicine (Tr. 348:6-13), and there was no evidence that she was abusing or overusing the 
pain medicine. There was no evidence that Wendy was suffering from hyperalgesia—Dr. 
Colledge's statements were not based on an examination or anything other than 
speculation. Dr. Hogenson testified that Wendy's dose of pain medication stayed stable 
while he was treating her, (Tr. 347:16-348:5) leading one to believe that her tolerance had 
not increased to the point of hyperalgesia. 
• One of Plaintiff s massage treatments was listed as a couples massage. (Pet. Br. 
13:12-13.) 
This statement is not supported by any evidence that Wendy's treatment that day 
was not medically necessary. Also, the record suggests that the massage for Mr. Harris 
was free, since the cost of the massage was $39.00, the same as Wendy's previous 
treatments. (R. at 1197,206 & 231 (Records of 8/1/2008).) Even if the jury determined 
that one-half of the cost was attributable to Mr. Harris, that conclusion would still only 
justify a deduction of $19.50. 
• Dr. Colledge testified that Wendy had gained weight, which negatively impacted 
her ability to overcome her conditions. (Pet. Br. 12:15-16). 
There was no testimony as to how the extra weight affected Wendy's treatment or 
damages. The uncontradicted evidence was that she was maintaining a low-calorie diet 
and keeping as active as her condition would allow. (Tr. 592:3-9; 596:6-11; 706:8-707:8.) 
Wendy did not need to engage in unreasonable efforts in order to lose weight. See 
Restatement (Second), supra, § 919 cmt. b. 
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Besides the lack of evidence that would support reducing the amounts of economic 
damages, the round amounts of the awards suggest that the jury did not decide which 
expenses were or were not compensable and add them together, but rather chose a 
number arbitrarily. A jury verdict that appears to have arbitrarily chosen an amount for an 
award of economic damages is based on insufficient evidence. See Judd v. Rowley's 
Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980) (holding that the jury was 
in error for reducing Plaintiffs award for economic damages without an evidentiary 
basis). The jury was presented with the amount of $33,203.34 in past medical expenses 
and $39,574.00 in future medical expenses and was given an itemization of these sums. 
Because the parties stipulated to the reasonableness of the amounts, the jury did not have 
discretion to reject that stipulation and decide that other numbers were more reasonable— 
they could only accept or reject item by item. There is simply no combination of figures 
presented to the jury that could total $15,000.00 in present damages or $10,000.00 in 
future damages, and so the conclusion is inescapable that the jury just chose figures out 
of the air. The jury verdict is therefore not based on sufficient evidence and the Court of 
Appeals correctly reversed the trial court's decision. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, AS THE TRIAL 
COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY TO REDUCE FUTURE DAMAGES TO 
PRESENT VALUE, AS DEFENDANT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE A BASIS 
FOR THE JURY TO REASONABLY CALCULATE THE PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
The trial court erred by charging the jury to reduce the award of future damages to 
present value where no evidence was presented to allow them to make such a 
determination. Consider the following: you will have expenses of $39,574.00 over the 
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next five years. Some expenses will accrue monthly, some quarterly, some semi-
annually. How much money would you need today, so that if it were prudently invested, 
would cover all $39,574.00 in expenses? By the way, this is a closed-book exam— 
consulting bond rates, savings rates, annuity tables and the like are not allowed. This was 
the question posed to the jury in this case, and the difficulty of deriving an answer from 
one's common sense and everyday experience underscores the Court of Appeals' 
statement in Gallegos v. Dick Simon Trucking that present value calculations are "almost 
impossible for a jury without assistance." 2004 UT App 322, ^  11, 110 P.3d 710; see also 
Brodie v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 203 A„2d 657, 659-60 (Pa. 1964) ("Trial judges and 
lawyers freely admit that the application of the "present worth rule" is beyond the 
understanding and capabilities of most lay persons serving on juries . . . . The involved 
process of reducing future losses to their present worth has, undoubtedly, led to confusion 
and guesswork verdicts."). While expert testimony is not necessary, competent evidence 
of present value, such as an annuity table or some similar actuarial table, must be 
introduced into evidence to assist the jury in making the calculation. See Bennett v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 213 P.2d 325, 328 (Utah 1950). Without some 
evidentiary basis to guide the jury, its reduction of damages would be completely 
arbitraiy and invalid. See TruGreen Companies, LLC. v. Mower Brothers, Inc., 2008 UT 
81,115, 199 P.3d 929. As stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "[T]he amount of 
future damages warranted by the evidence and the law in a given case is a mathematical 
fact. There is no logical reason why it should not be established by proof like other 
relevant facts." Brodie, 203 A.2d at 660. 
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But what party should be required to produce this evidence? As stated by the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the issue presented "is whether reduction to present 
value is an indispensable element of the plaintiffs claim for future lost wages which he 
must always prove by specific evidence or whether, absent contest by the defendant, the 
plaintiff sufficiently proves his claim by evidence of the gross amount of those lost 
wages." Aldridge v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 789 F.2d 1061, 1067 (4th Cir. 1986). As 
noted in the committee notes for the Model Utah Jury Instructions, there is no Utah case 
law on point, and other jurisdictions are split on the issue. Model Utah Jury Instructions 
2d CV2021 (Utah State Bar 2012), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji. 
However, the jurisdictions that have concluded that the burden of producing evidence of 
present value is on the Plaintiff invariably base their decisions on a conclusory statement 
that evidence of present value is a material element of a plaintiffs claim for future 
damages. See, e.g., Aldridge, 789 F. 2d at 1068 (Boyle, Dist. J., dissenting) ("The present 
value of lost future earnings is not an affirmative defense but rather a material element of 
the plaintiffs claim for that special damage."); Steppi v. Stromwasser, 297 A.2d 26, 27 
(Del. 1972) ("[The] burden is upon the plaintiff to prove the nature and extent of the loss 
caused by the defendant; that burden . . . is not satisfied by proof of the amount that she 
would have earned had she not been injured; that is not the true measure of her loss. Her 
proof is not complete without evidence of the present value of that loss."). As one 
commentator noted, allocation of burdens of proof based on "essential elements" and 
"affirmative propositions" are "hollow, semantic debate[s]" that are "easily manipulated" 
by altering the syntax of the issues presented. Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The 
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Economics of Legal Burdens, 1997 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1. The Court should reject the 
semantic approach to allocating burdens of proof in favor of a methodology of burden 
allocation based on maximizing efficiency and minimizing social costs ("cost 
minimization methodology"). See id. at 11-28. 
Cost minimization methodology posits that there are two types of costs associated 
with litigation: direct costs, which are the costs to the parties and to the courts or pursuing 
litigation; and error costs, which are the social costs associated with erroneous decisions 
by the court. Id. at 4-6. Under this methodology, burdens of proof and production of 
evidence are properly allocated when the frequency and magnitude of both types of costs 
are minimized. Id.19 
Allocating the burden to produce evidence of present value to the defendant is 
consistent with minimizing social costs for several reasons. First, the cost of non-
production is lower on the defendant than the plaintiff. If the defendant fails to meet its 
burden of producing the evidence, it has to pay the non-reduced value, see Miller v. 
Union P.R. Co., 900 F.2d 223, 226 (10th Cir. 1990), while if the plaintiff failed to 
produce the evidence, it would have failed to produce sufficient evidence of the amount 
of its future damages and so would lose all of its future damages, see Lewin Realty III, 
Inc. v. Brooks, 111 A.2d 446, 476 (Md. App. 2001). In this scenario, a plaintiff will 
19. While the cited article applies cost minimization methodology mostly to issues of 
liability, the principles apply equally as well to questions regarding the amount of 
damages. 
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almost always lose more than a defendant. Second, while the direct cost of producing 
this evidence is theoretically equal for both parties, because the defendant benefits from 
the introduction of evidence of present value, it should bear the direct cost of producing 
it. See Aldridge, 789 F.2d at 1067 ("To the extent that the issue [of determining present 
value] in a given case necessarily becomes difficult, it seems fair to place the burden of 
procuring and presenting economic evidence on the litigant who would benefit from its 
acceptance by the factfinder."); Alma v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 684 F.2d 622, 
626 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding on that basis that defendant should produce evidence or 
present value, while plaintiff should produce evidence of inflation); Lewin, 111 A.2d 
473-74; Miller, 900 F.2d at 226; see also John Call Engineering Corp. v. Manti City 
Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990) ("It is not a plaintiffs burden to produce the 
evidence on which any reduction of damages is to be predicated."); Ault, 739 P.2d at 
1120-21 (allocating on defendant the burden to show that an alternate method of valuation 
would lead to reduced recovery). Finally, placing the burden of proof on the defendant is 
consistent with the policy preference in Utah law that once liability has been established, 
it is "the wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should bear the burden of some 
uncertainty in the amount of damages." Atkin Wright & Miles, 709 P.2d at 336; cf. Lee, 
20. Assuming a discount rate of 2% above the rate of inflation and equal yearly 
withdrawals, a defendant's cost of nonproduction would only be lower if the plaintiff 
were awarded future damages 79 years or more into the future. 
21. It is for this reason that producing evidence of present value can be distinguished 
from the requirement of producing evidence of both revenue and costs in determining lost 
profits—evidence of the costs of doing business is almost entirely within the possession 
of the plaintiff, making the direct cost of producing such evidence lower. 
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supra, at 20-27 (discussing minimization of costs based on a policy determination that 
some errors are more costly than others). Additionally, these grounds for allocating the 
burden to defendant have been endorsed as sound by several other jurisdictions, including 
all but one federal circuit. See Lewin, 771 A.2d 470-77 (citing and discussing cases). 
Therefore, the burden of production of reduction to present value is properly on the 
defendant. 
In this case, there was absolutely no evidence of any kind that would have 
instructed the jury on how to make a present value calculation. Because the burden to 
produce that evidence was on the Defendant, its failure to present the evidence constitutes 
a waiver of the present value theory of reducing damages. Cf. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 
1352,1354 (Utah 1986) (holding that a defendant's failure to present evidence of 
mitigation at trial waived the defense). Because the trial court instructed the jury on 
reducing future damages to present value when Defendant had waived the theory, the jury 
likely reduced the future damages when they should not have. Further, because the jury 
had absolutely no guidance about how to reduce future damages, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that they overestimated the amount of reduction, meaning that Plaintiffs 
award would have been higher. The reasonable likelihood of harm is supported by the 
disparity between the ample evidence of future economic damages presented at trial and 
the amount of future damages that the jury actually awarded. The trial court's error 
prejudiced Plaintiff, justifying a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Harris respectfully asks this Court to affirm the court of 
appeals' decision in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of June, 2012. 
/S/Nathan Whittaker 
Nathan Whittaker, for himself and 
Michael E. Day 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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